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ABSTRACT. "Sustainable Development" refers t o  a set of issues relating 
to  two general questions: (1) .Are the presently prevailing technologies and life- 
styles of economic development so destructive of the earth's natural resources 
and environment that  the current pace of development cannot be maintained? 
(2) If so. what combinations of technology, life-style. and rate of growth are 
sustainable in the 'long-run,' and what mechanisms of cooperation and incen- 
tives can be devised to  implement them? After providing some introductory 
background material for newcomers to the subject, and concluding that  the an- 
swer to  the first question is "yes." I sketch some challenges to  economic theory 
implied by the second question. In particular, I argue that ,  for transnational is- 
sues like global warming, the 'standard' approaches of mechanism design theory 
are inadequate in the absence of a world government or equivalent institution 
for enforcing cooperative agreements. On the other hand, the typical large 
multiplicity of noncooperative equilibria of such global dynamic "games" cre- 
ates a role for analysts to discover (invent?) equilibria that  are superior to  
the status-quo equilibrium, if indeed the current situation can reasonably be 
interpreted as a (dynamic) equilibrium. I explore this idea in the context of an 
oversimplified model of the "Global Warming Game." 
"Stern School of Business, MEC 9-68 
New York University 
44 W. Fourth Street 
New York, NY 10012 
email: rradnerQstern.nyu.edu 
The dramatic rise of the world's population in the last three centuries. coupled with 
an even more dramatic acceleration of economic development in some parts of the 
world. has led to a transformation of the natural environment by humans that is 
unprecedented in its scale. The magnitude and rate of this transformation have led 
many experts to question whether the present rate of economic development can be 
sustained for much longer without very significant global changes in technology, and 
even in the life style of economically developed societies. The group of issues arising 
out of these questions has come to  be called the problem of "sustainable development7' 
(SD). 
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There 1s no generally acceptable definition of the concept of SD. A much-quoted 
definition was formulated by the World Commission on Environment and Develop 
ment (Bruntland, 1987, p.43) "development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
So-called "strong" versions of SD require that certain specified resources or charac- 
teristics of the environment (e.g.. ecosystems. atmospheric carbon dioxide) be main- 
tained within specified limits ' 'Vkik' ' forms of SD require that some measure of 
social well-being (e.g.. GlVP per capita) not decline over tlme. 
At this stage of my exposition. it 1s not necessary to fix upon a particular definition 
of SD. Instead, I shall mention a number of more specific problems that,  if not solved 
In some manner, may pose a threat to  SD, however defined 
1. global warming, 
2. depletion of cheap energy sources, 
3. depletion of the ozone layer, 
4. exhaustion of arable land. 
5. loss of vital ecosystems (e.g., watersheds, wetlands. food chains), 
6. reduction of biodiversity. 
7.  smog, acid rain. other air pollution. 
8. buildup of toxic wastes. 
9. pollution of water supplies. 
Many of these problems are interrelated, often in complex ways. For example. de- 
forestation contributes to  global warming (see below) and the loss of ecosystems. e.g., 
watersheds. The latter contributes to the pollution of water supplies by destroying 
natural water-purification systems. Deforestation may also result in increased erosion, 
which in turn reduces the supply of arable land, and may result in the destruction of 
natural habitats, which in turn reduces biodiversity. 
Finally. I must mention: 
10. population growth. 
which need not be a problem in itself, but contributes t o  the  causes of the pre- 
ceding problems. Figure 1 shows the growth of human population in broad historical 
perspective. According to Deevey (1960). there were three "spurts," associated with 
the tool-making, agricultural. and industrial "revolutions." respectively. In recent 
times, growth rates have been falling gradually, with approximately zero growth rates 
in many developed countries. The current world human population is about 5 112 
billion. Figure 2 shows various forecasts of the world population between now and 
21 50. For example, the World Bank forecasts that  the population will approximately 
double by 2150. The UN "medium" forecast is of a leveling off a t  about 10 billion by 
2100. with a range of major projections from 8 t o  15 billion. A doubling of the world 
population in this period would certainly ag@axrate most or all of the problems listed 
above. unless there were important changes in technology and/or life styles. 
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In what follows I shall focus primarily on the problem of global warming. This 
problem poses interesting theoretical challenges for several reasons: 
(1) It is international is scope. and will require international, or at least transna- 
tlonal, cooperation for its solution; [Note: I shall use the term "transnational" to  
refer to  groups of more than one country, but not necessarily all countries.] 
(2) Its dynamics are long-lasting, and reversibility. even if possible, is very slow: 
(3) Because of the long time scale (point 2 above). the issues of intergenerational 
equity are significant: 
(4) Because of significant international differences in population, rates of popula- 
tion growth. levels of economic development. and cdtural attitudes, issues of inter- 
national equity are also significant: and 
( 5 )  Although the scientific basis of global warnling is qualitatively established. 
there is considerable quantitative uncertainty (and disagreement) about its dynamics 
and its consequences. 
There have, of course. been dramatic fluctuations in the Earth's climate during 
its history. For example. on a geological time scale the last ice age ended only 
recently. However. the threat of "global warming" (GW) is that ,  under "business 
as usual," the temperature of the atmosphere near ground level may increase by 
almost 6 degrees C. by the year 2100. (See Cline. 1992, pp. 4 ff., for the sources of 
this and other estimates. some of which are lower. See also Bruce et al, 1996. and 
Thomson, 1997.) The mechanism of this warming trend is the so-called greenhouse 
efect .  "Carbon dioxide and [certain] trace gases (methane, CFCs, nitrous oxide. 
ozone) are transparent to incoming shortwave solar radiation but opaque to outgolng 
longwave (iAfrared) radiation from the earth. Their natural levels raise the earth's 
average temperature by some 33 degrees C. (from -18 degrees to  +15 degrees).'' 
[Cline, 1992, p. 4.1 
Carbon dioxide (C02)  is by far the most important of the "greenhouse gases," at 
least for the time frame we are considering. and I shall focus on it. (In what follows. 
I shall talk about "COs equivalents," when it is important to  make the distinction. 
(On the problem of "emissions accounting" for greenhouse gases, see Grubler and 
Fijii. 1992.) 
Carbon dioxide is produced by the metabolism of living organisms, and by other 
activities of humans. On the other hand, C 0 2  is broken down by photosynthesis In 
plants. We can think of t h s  as a "negative emission." (Photosynthetic plants break 
down CO;! during the day. and produce it at  night.) Also. as  the concentration of C 0 2  
In the atmosphere increases, the oceans recapture some of it, but very slowly. The 
net result of these activities is a net emission rate of COz. Currently, the burning of 
fossil fuels accounts for most of the carbon emissions actually produced by humans. 
However, the destruction of forests and other changes in land use have reduced the 
rate of global photosynthesis. This, in turn, reduces the rate a t  which C 0 2  is removed 
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from the atmosphere. thus increasing the net emission of C 0 2 .  Figure 3 shows the 
history of net C 0 2  emissions from fossil-fuel use. changes in forest and soil, and 
cement production from 1800 to  1987. We see that fossil-fuel use currently accounts 
for more than two-thirds of the (net) emissions. with changes in forest and land use 
accounting for most of the rest. 
Almost all of the burning of fossil fuels is done for the purpose of producing 
energy. Figure 4 shows the shares of difierent regions in current and past energy- 
related carbon emissions. Note that fiorth America currently produces about 27 
percent of such emissions, with the bulk of thls corning from the U.S. Note. too, that 
the current share of Asia (not including Japan) is double its cumulative share since 
1800, reflecting its recent spurt in economic development. Of the regions listed, the 
share of Asia ranks second. On the other hand. the current and cumulative shares 
of North America are about equal. If u.e look at per capita carbon ernissions horn 
fossil-fuel use (Fiewe 5)) the picture is somewhat different. North America still ranks 
first in both current and cumulative emissions (per capita), whereas Asia is about 
a t  the bottom. A notable feature of Fig. 5 is that in all regions these per-capita 
emissions have increased substantially7 reflecting the pace of economic development. 
Furthermore. given the large population of Asia. and its rate of population growth, if 
per capita carbon emissions in Asia were to  increase to North American and Western 
European levels, the total emissions from Asia would increase enormously. 
In recent times. almost all of our energy has been derived from the burning of fos- 
sil fuels. with some contribution from moving water. and very recently, from atomic 
power (the combined contribution of "solar energy.'' geothermal sources, and wind- 
mills is still negligible). Nevertheless. the world is becoming more "efficient" in its 
use of carbon One way to see this is provided by Figure 6, which shows, for a 
selection of countries. the relationship betlveen (1) the ratio of carbon emissions to  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), on the vertical axis, and (2) per-capita GDP, on the 
horizontal axis. over periods of time for which data are available. In almost all of 
the countries. carbon/GDP has declined with an increase in per-capita GDP Another 
view is provided by Figure 7, which shows recent time trends in carbon emissions per 
unit of energy. for five countries. Note that for the most recent available year. India 
and China use roughly fifty percent more carbon per unit of energv than do France. 
Japan, and the U.S. 
The potential for the reduction of carbon emissions associated with the use of 
energy has three potential sources: increased efficiency in the production of energy. 
increased efficiency in the use of e n e r e  and changes in the consumption of the 
services of energy. 
In part, the progressive "decarbonization" of energy production is ~ssociated with 
the movement from coal to  oil and natural gas. 
"Carbon matters because i t  burns: combustion releases energy.. .. .Carbon enters 
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t,he energy economy in the hydrocarbon fuels, coal, oil, and gas, as well as wood. 
In fact: the truly desira,ble element in these fuels for energy genera.tion is not their 
carbon (C) but their hydrogen (H). Wood weighs in heavily at  ten effective Cs for 
each H. Coal approaches parity with one or t,wo Cs per H, while oil improves to two 
H per C ,  and a molecule of natural gas (methane) is a carbon-trim CH4 ...... Physical 
scientists can measure decarbonization in its elemental form: as the evolution of the 
atomic rat,io of hydrogen to carbon in the world fuel mix. This analysis reveals the 
unrelenting t,hough slow ascendance of hydrogen in the energy market.'' (Ausubel, 
1996, pp. 3,4.) 
Energ?/ from hydrogen fusion react90rs would represent the ultimate in decar- 
bonization. Unfortunately, it appears that formidable technical problems remain 
to be solved before this method becomes practical. Other, similarly "decarbonized" 
technologies for energy production are nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, geothermal, and 
wind. 
Another source of decarbonization is increased efficiency in the utilization of en- 
ergy, coming from improvements in the design of electric generation and transmis- 
sion systems, electric motors, combustion engines, manufacturing systems, heating 
and cooling systems, etc. Recall that  a "good stove did not emerge until 1744 AD. 
Benjamin Franklin's invention proved to  be a moment,ous event for tlhe forests and 
woodpiles of America." (Ausubel, 1996, p. 4.) A review of this topic is beyond the 
scope of these Notes. However, i t  may be significant that,  whereas the generation 
and transmission of electricity is a "public utility'' in most countries, and the pro- 
duction of many fossil fuels, especially coal, is subsidized by t~he state, the utilization 
of most energy is in private hands, and improvements in the efficiency of utilization 
can usually be appropriated by the developers. 
The costs and benefits of global warming are subject to considerable uncertainty 
and debate. My discussion here is primarily qualitative, and is only intended to 
illustrate the points (1) - ( 5 )  above that  make the problem theoretically challenging. 
(In my description of the costs and benefits, I have relied heavily on (Cline, 1992).) 
Roughly speaking, the costs and benefits of GIV are themselves the results of two 
primary effects: (1) a rise in the sea level, and (2) climate changes. The rise in the 
sea level is caused by melting of glacial ice, especially at  the poles. and t o  some extent 
by the t,hermal expansion of the sea water. The rise in the sea level would damage, 
and even eliminate, many coastlines: and would be particularly costly t o  low-lying 
areas, such as Bangladesh, the Netherlands, and the eastern seaboard of the U.S. (for 
example). Climate changes are more complex. In some parts of the world, like the 
northern lat,itudes of North America, the warming would be accompanied by higher 
rainfall. This, with the lengthening of t,he summer growing period, would increase 
the asicult,ural productivity of such areas: benefiting Canada, t,he U.S., and Russia. 
(It is also thought by some that higher COz concentrations in the atmosphere would 
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stimulate plant growth.) Other parts of the world. such as Sub-Saharan Africa. would 
probably become more arid and less productive agriculturally. Other effects would 
include: 
a.  Increased energy requirements for air-conditioning. only partially offset by 
reduced heating costs. 
b. Lesser runoff in water basins. curtailing water supplies. 
c. Increased urban air pollution (tropospheric ozone). 
d. Damage to human health. e.g.. resulting from ~ncreased heat stress, and from 
the increased incidence of malaria. 
e. Forest loss. 
f. Increased hurricane and fire damage. 
g. Costly increased immigration. 
Damages are likely to be nonlinear in the amount of %.arming. For example, "in the 
initial range. the Antarctic does not contribute to  sea-level rise, because temperature 
in is a low range where increased rnelting is more than offset by increased snow 
carried by air with more moisture. On the scale of 10 degrees warming, however, the 
Antarctic would likely become a major source of sea-level rise. especially if the West 
Antarctic ice shelf should disintegrate. Similarly for agriculture. heat stress could be 
expected t o  impose nonlinear damage." (Cline, 1992. p. 6.) Such a nonlinearity. 
coupled with uncertainty, has an effect analogous to  that  of risk aversion. [Thus. 
if the marginal cost of GW is increasing with the degree of GW, and the degree of 
GW is uncertain, then the expected cost of GW will be greater than the  cost of the 
expected value of the  GW.] 
The efforts t o  avoid GW will. of course, be costly. Immediate costs would be 
incurred if economies were forced to  substitute more expensive but less carbon inten- 
slve technologies for producrng energy. Cutbacks in energy use would also be costly 
in terms of lower levels of output of goods and services. including ''amenities'' such 
as household cooling. On the other hand: "...There is another body of literature 
that suggests that some initial ... cutback can be obtained for free. The engineering 
tradition cites several avenues (such a s  compact fluorescent lights) by which e n e r a  
needs may be reduced a t  zero or even negative cost. Market imperfections such as 
utility pricing rules that  do not reward energy saved nlay contribute t o  this situa- 
t ~ o n  .... [Sltudies by the  U.S. National Academy of Sc~ences and others suggest that 
this initial tranche of zero-cost energy reduction may be on the order of 20 percent." 
(Cline. 1992, p. 7.) Perhaps most important, significant long-term reductions or even 
stabilization of carbon emissions would require significant research and development 
efforts. whose outcomes would also be uncertain. As usual, many of the  outputs of 
such R&D efforts are likely t o  have the character of public goods, and hence require 
some form of governmental or social intervention. 
It is tempting t o  apply cost-benefit analysis to the evaluation of GW polices. 
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Of course, for this one needs quantitative, not merely qualitative, assessments of 
t,he effects of GW. A conclusion of Cline's study (1992); which is among the more 
ambitious is this regard, is that,  wit,h "central values of key parameters, ... the 
ratio of the present discounted value of benefits to that of costs [of GMi damage 
avoidance] is approximately 3:4," from which the reader would probably conclude 
that t,he avoidance of GW- is not economically justified. However, a consideration of 
risk-aversion leads Cline to  revise his estimat,e of the ratio of expected benefits to 
expected costs, obtaining a new ratio of 1.3 to 1. Cline is, of course, aware of the 
uncertainty that  surrounds his estimates. (Cf. also [Fordhaus and Yang, 19961.) 
Estimat.es of the net benefit of actions taken to prevent or abate GW depend 
heavily on the cost-benefit methodology that is used. For one thing, the long Lime 
period involved in t,he calculations make the choice of a discount rate (or rates) im- 
portant. Second, as is tl-pical in the case of most environmental issues, it is important 
to include all of the (sometimes hidden) costs and benefits, and to  get the prices right, 
which is especially difficult for goods and services for which markets are imperfect or 
nonexistsent. (See Ahmad, et al, 1989; Pearce: et al, 1989; Dasgupta and Mitra, 1997; 
Weitzman, 1995.) Third: the int,ernational (and even intranational) distribution of 
costs and benefits is highly non-uniform, as noted above with respect to  changes in 
the sea-level and in agricultural productivity. For example, how would Bangladesh, 
whose per-capita income is significantly less than that of Canada, be induced to  corn- 
pensate the latter for the expense of abating GW, just because Canada would be 
a hypothetical beneficiary of GW through higher agricultural productivity? Or, for 
that matter, what would be the politics of getting the Eastern Seaboard states of the 
U.S. t,o compensate the upper Midwestern states, for the same reason? Finally, there 
is the question of how t80 account for risk, and especially "cat,astrophicl' risks! 
2. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 
2.1. Nat ional  a n d  Transnat ional  Issues. '\Ve should distinguish between is- 
sues that are national from those that  are transnational. Even for small countries. 
depletion of cheap energy sources, exhaustion of arable land, loss of vital ecosystems. 
smog and other local air pollution, local buildup of toxic wastes, and pollution of 
~vater supplies will typically be national issues. (Cf. the list in Sec. 1.) For national 
Issues. one can imagine that the national government can pass laws and/or issue reg- 
ulations that determine the "rules of the game" for participants (e.g., individuals. 
corporations, local governments), and enforce these rules. Here we have a standard 
mechanism design situation. in which one predicts that the outcome will be a Nash 
equilibrium (NE) of the game (possibly subject to  certain refinements, with or with- 
out complete information. etc.). The task is to  design a mechanism that implements 
(uniquely or otherwise) a given concept of sustainable development (SD). But there is 
also the task of getting the mechanism enacted into law (see below). For transnat~onal 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-99-2 
issues. such as global lvarming. depletion of the ozone layer. oceanic pollution. deple- 
tion of food species in international waters. acid rain. and the buildup of other toxic 
\Tastes tha t  cross national borders, there is no capability for higher-level enforcement. 
e.g.. no world government to enforce the rules of a game. Exceptions might include 
the European Community and (to some extent) the United Nations. but thus far the 
UN has not shown itself willing to enforce environmental policies. In this case. the 
"rules of the game" are determined by the powers of the individual governments and 
the laws of Nature. If there is more than one NE of t h s  game. then the problem 
of mechanism design is replaced by the problem of identifying the best equilibria. 
according to  some global criterion. The analyst can contribute to the solution of this 
problem. However. a further task is to move the participants from the status quo to 
an optimal or superior NE. 
2.2 .  N a t i o ~ l a l  Issues and Mechanism Design. Most of my remarks in this 
talk will be directed towards transnational issues. However. even in the national 
case, the  particular form of the national (or local) government will implicitly deter- 
mine a game whose outcome is the mecha~usrn that is adopted. For example, in the 
U.S. the adoption of national legislation to regulate toxic emissions is the outcome 
of a complicated legislative game whose players include the members of Congress, 
the Administration. and lobbyists and contributors to  political campaign funds. Fur- 
thermore. as the U.S. experience with Prohibition (of alcoholic beverages) illustrates, 
the government's ability to enforce the rules of some ''games" may be limited. This 
suggests that some further serious theoretical work is needed to  bridge the gap be- 
tween the "classical " formulation of the mechanism design problem and the theory of 
political action at the national and local level. This problem has not. of course, been 
neglected by political scientists and 'I poli tical economists. " (For thought-provoking 
discussions of these issues from a game-theoretic point of view, see Schotter, 1986, 
and Hurwicz, 1993, 1996.) 
2.3. Transnat ional  Issues. Transnational issues present a more difficult chal- 
lenge to the theory of "mechanism design" than do national issues. In fact. as 1 have 
suggested above. because of the absence of a worId government or equi\~alezlt au- 
thority in the environmental arena. the standard mechanism design paradigm is not 
applicable to transnational issues. Instead. from a game-theoretic point of view. the 
problem would appear to  be one of moving the community of national governments 
from one dynamic (sequential) Nash equilibrium (NE) to another that one hopes is 
superior. 
A good example to  have in mind is the threat of global warming. described at 
some length in the previous section. Recall that ,  roughly speaking, on the relevant 
time scale, the evolution of global warming is a complicated function of the initial 
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condition of the atmosphere (at  some given date) and the subsequent history of global 
levels of "greenhouse gases," primarily carbon dioxide. These levels depend, in turn. 
on the history of global emissions of greenhouse gases by the burning of fossil fuels. 
the amount of forestation and other flora. etc. In addition, the local effects of global 
warming depend on the evolution of sea levels and temperatures, the melting of polar 
ice. weather patterns, and a number of other variables. 
To the extent that the evolution of global warming depends on global (i.e., total 
world) emissions of greenhouse gasses, global forestation. etc.. the situat~on is for- 
mally analogous to the "problem of the commons." as in the cases of fishing from a 
common population. or grazing on a common pasture. Thus we might expect to  learn 
something about the structure of the set of NEs from the literature on the problem 
of the commons, although the law of motion in this case will be different. It is well 
known that such games typically have many NEs. some of which are Pareto superior 
to  others. The situation here is analogous to  the simpler case of "repeated games." 
but richer because of the presence of state variables that evolve through time, and 
hence the results of the theory of repeated games cannot be blindly applied to  such 
dynamic games. A typical situation is that  there is a set of NEs in which. a t  any date. 
the actions of the players depend only on the state variable(s). but not directly on the 
past actions of the other players. Such NEs are called Markovian; they correspond in 
some rough seme to  the equilibria of repeated games in which players repeatedly play 
equilibrium strategies of the one-stage game. Other NEs may involve strategies in 
which players react directly to  past actions of the other players; these NEs can often 
be interpreted in the language of "retaliation against departures from cooperative 
behavior." Although I am not aware of any general theorem to  this effect, it would 
appear that h4arkovian NEs typically display "competitive" behavior that is ineffi- 
cient In a "co~mnons" context, whereas NEs that involve threats of retaliation can be 
used t o  sustain more cooperative and globally efficient behavior. (See, e.g., Benhabib 
and Radner. 1992; Dutta and Sundaram. 1996: Radner, 1991.) T h s  phenomenon is 
illustrated in Section 3, in the context of a simple model of a "global warming game." 
For example. in a plausible model of two nations fishing in a common fishing- 
ground. the total discounted qliantity of joint,ly harvested fish is maximized by doing 
no fishng until the fish population reaches some critical level. and then (jointly) har- 
vesting at  a rate that just maintains the fish population at  that level. (For example. 
the two nations may each harvest a t  one half the optimal rate. once the critical level 
has been reached.) However, one NE may involve "overfishing" to  the extent that 
the population of fish tends asymptotically to  zero. In another pair of strategies 
(sometimes called "trigger strategies). each nation observes the other's fishing rate, 
and reverts to the "overfishing NE" rate if the other ever departs from the jointly 
optimal rate. The second pair of strategies will be a NE if the players' discount rates 
are not too large, relative to the other data of the problem, in which case it will 
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sustain a jointly optimal total rate of fishng. (See Benhabib and Radner, 1992. for a 
related model and references t o  other literature.) Note that. if the dynamics of the 
fish population are stochastic. it will not be possible to infer with certainty from the 
observation of the current fish population alone whether the other nation has followed 
the jointly optimal fishing policy. Hence. in order to implement the second (jointly 
optimal) NE, it will be necessary for each nation to  observe the  other's fishing rate. 
not just the evolution of the fish population. In this sense. the "overfishing N E  will 
be Mwkov~an, whereas the second. jointly optimal. NE will not. 
We may interpret the negotiation of a treaty or other ( nonbinding) transna- 
tional agreement as the process of moving to a new NE. [Note: Victor and Skolnikoff 
(1997) describe "how governments. industry. and nor~governmental organizations put 
[transnat~onal] environmental agreements into practice" in a way that  lends itself to  
this interpretation, although they do not use the language of game theory.] How- 
ever. we don't have a good theory of how this is done, or at least a good theory 
that  is compatible with game theory (although the general situation is reminiscent of 
the theory of "renegotiation-proofness). If the status quo were a NE, then we could 
imag~ne a bargaining "metagame" in which the players negotiate a move to  a new 
NE. For example. suppose that  (1) the status quo will have a very bad outcome for all 
players after some specific date (call this date the "deadline"); (2) the  target NE has 
been specified in advance (i.e.. there is no process of negotiating the  specific terms 
of the agreement): (3) each player signals a commitment t o  the agreement by t ahng  
some ~rreversible action (like incurring a sunk cost); (3) certain subsets of players are 
sufficient to  "initiate" the new IVE: then we might interpret the situation as a "wu 
of attrition with a deadline.'' [Note: This observation is due t o  Giuseppe Lopomo. in 
a private communication.] 
In modellng such games, we may ask which simplificat~ons are least harmful, and 
which are to  be avoided. For example, in the area of global warming, scientific and 
technological uncertainty will typically be important. whereas the relevant scientific 
information will typically be widely available (at least to  scientists), so that  it may be 
relati~ely safe to assume that  the available scientific information is common knowledge 
(although the preferences for costs and benefits may be private). On the  other hand. 
there will typically be  dramat~c  asymmetries in the situat~ons of the  players (e.g 
slze. capltal stocks, stage of industrial development, per capita income, education. 
etc.). so that the common practice of game theorists of analyzing symmetric games 
will usually be seriously inappropriate. 
[Note: Nordhaus and Yang (1996) use a model with a diversity of country types 
t o  contrast "cooperative" and " noncooperative'' policies. However, their "noncoop- 
erative" equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in so-called "open-loop policies," i.e.. each 
country is able to  commit t o  a time path of actions that is adhered t o  whatever the 
subsequent states of the system or actions of the other countries. It  is difficult to  jus- 
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tify the realism of such commitments, and in particular the corresponding equilibria 
do not in general satisfy the requirement of subgarne perfection. although it is not 
known to  me in what respect they would differ from any of the equilibria described 
above in this particular application.] 
2.4. I l l ter temporal  and Distr ibutional  Preferences. Issues in sustainable 
development usually (but not always) concern significant and persistent costs and 
benefits in the fairly distant future, say 50 to 200 ).ears from now. It is therefore 
important t o  give a good deal of thought to the representation of the intertempora! 
preferences of the relevant players. Here we can observe an apparent paradox. On the 
one hand, if future benefits are discounted at plausible "market" rates, their present 
value at  relevant time horizons will be very small. and the net present value of envl- 
I o~m~en ta l  projects will typically be negative. (See the remarks on global warming in 
the previous section.) For example, if the discount rate is 8 percent, the discounted 
present value of one dollar 50 years from now is less than two cents. Even at  a dis- 
count rate of 2 percent, the present vaIue of one dollar 50 years from now is 37 cents. 
and the present value at  year 200 is 0.18 cents. On the other hand, significant groups 
in many countries appear to be in favor of such projects with negative present value. 
Some authors have proposed that,  on ethical grounds. the standard procedures 
of discounting should not be applied to  environmental projects. Others. citing ex- 
perimental evidence, have argued that  discounted present value does not adequately 
represent the preferences of "ordinary" economic agents (see the references cited in 
Chichilnisky, 196613). Chichilnisky (1996a) has proposed a criterion that is a weighted 
average of a present discounted value and a "purely asymptotic" value. With t h s  
criterion, projects whose benefits and costs extend over only a finite period of time 
will be compared by their discounted present values. whereas a project whose bene- 
fits and costs are "infinitely long-livedff will have an additional value. Of course. the 
concept of "infinitely long-lived" benefits and/or costs must be taken with a grain of 
salt (at least in the material rather than spiritual realm). but rnay still be useful as 
an approximation when thinking about the "very long run." 
Environmental projects also have diverse distributional consequences. among as 
\yell as within, nations and regions. Citizens and governments reveal by their actions 
that they are not entirely insensitive t o  these distributional issues, although thls 
sensitivity rnay decrease with greater geographical and/or cultural remoteness. I 
have alluded to such distributional issues in the case of global warming. at  the end 
of Section 1. At a national level, richer citizens of many countries are willing to be 
taxed progressively in order to  provide poorer citizens (of the same country) with 
food, medical care, housing, and education. It is more difficult, however, to  persuade 
these richer citizens to  provide comparable benefits to the poorer citizens of other 
countries. [There is, of course, some question as to how much of these ".rvelfarel' 
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programs are seen as "social insurance" rather than a "redistributive justice."] At an 
international level. countr~es may be more willing to aid "culturally similar" countries 
than "culturally distant " ones. 
Both of these "non-neoclassical" types of preference - for asymptotic consequences 
and for distributional consequences - may present additional challenges for the game- 
theoretic analysis of sustainable development. I t  is also possible that the revealed in- 
terteniporal and distribut~onal preferences of citizem and governments are not strictly 
self-consistent. [See (Schelling. 1995) for a thoughtful discussion of the relation be- 
tween intertemporal and distributional preferences. and (Bradford. 1997) for a further 
discussion of the use of benefit-cost analysis of global warming.] 
From a gametheoretic point of view. it is essential to try to  represent realistically 
the  preferences of the players as they are. rather than as the theorist thinks they 
"ought to  be." -4s noted above. the evidence about the actual preferences of nations 
(if the concept is meaningful) may be mixed. but on the whole econo~nists and game 
theorists tend to represent nations as largely impatient and selfish. Eevertheless. it 
would be interesting to  examine the NEs of environmental games in which the players 
have "non-neocl~sical" preferences, such as proposed by Chichilnisky (1996a). 
2.5. Bounded  Ratioiiality. Nations. as well individuals, are boundedly rational, 
and one may question whether they play their games according to  fully worked- 
out strategies. much less Nash Equilibrium profiles of strategies. If this caveat is 
significant, then one needs an alternative theory to predict the behavior of players 
in environmental games. In this case. one may also question the relevance of game- 
theoretic mechanism design, or its cousin. equilibrium selection, for the elucidation 
of social policy (see Radner, 1996): since mechanism design theory postulates that 
outcomes are NEs 
When we leave the strict confines of complete rationality and game theory, we 
enter the territory of "organizational behavior." Here we have to  deal with elusive 
concepts such as "leadership" and "management style." At the individual level, the 
perceptions of different facets of SD may be distorted. not merely by ignorance and 
obsolete information. but also by various psychological mechanisms (see. e.g.. Glad- 
win. et al. 1997) Whether there is a satisfactory way to bridge the gap between 
economics and game theory on the one hand. and the fields of individual and organi- 
zational psychology on the other, remains to be seen. 
In spite of these caveats, it would seem to  be a potentially useful exercise for the 
analyst to identify heretofore unrecognized dynamic self-enforcing profiles (sequential 
NEs) of international behavior that are superior to the status quo. In fact. if individ- 
uals and nations are boundedly rational, then the analysts have even more scope for 
influencing international behavior by exercising "leadership" or educating those who 
do. If one is not entirely to abandon the gametheoretic paradigm, a rnajor challenge 
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for the theorist is to  model in a useful way how players move from one sequential 
equilibrium to  another. 
3. A SIMPLE GLOBAL WARMING AME 
3.1. The Model.  In this section I contrast a Markov Nash Equilibrium (NINE) 
with the global Pareto optima (GPOs) for a greatly simplified model of a "global 
warming game." TVe shall see that the MNE emission rate for each country is higher 
than it is in any GPO. I shall also discuss the possible existence of equilibria that 
are Pareto superior to this MNE. Finally. in the context of a simple production- 
function model. I shall examine the effects on welfare and emission rates of changing 
the emission-producing technology. 
There are I countries. The emission of ( a  scalar index of) greenhouse gases during 
period t by country i is denoted by a,(t). [Time is discrete. with t = 0,1,2,  ... , ad 
i d . ,  and the a,(t) are nonegative.] Let A(t) denote the global (total) emission during 
period t; 
I 
The total (global) stock of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at the beginning of period t is 
denoted by g(t)+go, where go is what the "normal" steady-state stock of GHGs would 
be if there were negligible emissions from human sources (e.g.. the level of GHGs in 
the year 1800). We might call g(t) the excess GHG, but I shall usually suppress the 
word "excess." The law of motion for the GHG is 
where a is a given parameter (0 < a < 1). We may interpret (1 - a) as the fraction of 
the beglnnlng-of-period stock of GHG that is dissipated from the atmosphere during 
the period. The "surviving" stock. ag(t) .  is augmented by the quantity of global 
emissions, A(t) ,  during the same period. [Not,e: A realistic model of GHG dynamics 
would be more complicated; see (Thomson, 1997).] 
Suppose that the utility of country i in period t is 
vi ( t)  = hi [ai ( t ) ]  - cig (t ) . 
The function h, represents, for example. what country i 's gross national product 
would be at different levels of its own emissions, holding the global level of GHG 
constant. This function reflects the costs and benefits of producing and using energy 
from alternative sources, including fossil fuels. For a given population there will be 
an optimal level of energy use, and hence an optimal level of emissions, not taking 
account of the costs of the stock of GHG: call this the myopzcally optzmal level of 
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emissions. It therefore seems natural to assume that h, is a strictly concave C' 
function that  reaches a maximum at the myopically opt~mal evel of emissions (finite) 
and then decreases thereafter. The parameter c, > 0 represents the marginal cost t o  
the country of increasing the global stock of GHG. Of course. it is not the stock of 
GHG ~tself that is costly. but the associated climatic conditions. In a more general 
model. the cost would be nonlinear. The total payoff (utility) for country i s 
For the  sake of simplicity. I have taken the discount factor. 6. to  be the same for all 
countr~es. [Note: It  has implicitly been assumed here that each country's populat~on 
is constant In time. See Sectlon 4 for comments on this issue. See also (Dutta and 
Radner . 1998) .] 
A strategy for a country determines for each period the country's emission level ZE 
a funtion of the entire past history of the system, including the past actions of all the 
countr~es. A statzonary strategy for country i is function that maps the current state. 
g. into a current action, a,. As usual. a h'ash Equzlzbrzum is a profile of strategies 
such that no individual country can increase its payoff by unzlaterally changing its 
strategy. A Aarkov Nash Equzlzbnum (MNE) is a Nash Equilibrium in which every 
country's strategy is stationary 
[Note: The model described above is what Sobel (1990) calls an "affine dynam~c 
model " The results in Sect~ons 3.2 and 3.3 below follo\v from Sobel's paper, but I 
provide proofs here for the convenience of the reader. For a more complete charac- 
terization of the equilibria of this game. not covered in Sobel (1990). see (Dutta and 
Radner, 1998) .] 
3.2. The  Global  Pareto Optimum. Let x = (x,) be a vector of positive num- 
bers. one for each country. A Global Pareto Optimum (GPO) corresponding to  x is 
a profile of strategies that  maximizes the weighted sum of country payoffs, 
which I shall call the global welfare. Without loss of generality, we may take the 
weights, x,, to sum t o  I. 
Theorem 1. Let ~ ( g )  be the maximum attainable global welfare starting with an 
initial GHG stock equal to g ;  then 
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where hi is deternu'ned bj- 
xih;(tii) = 6 ~ .  
(It is assumed that this last equation has a solution.) Furthermore, country 2's GPO 
strateg-v is to use a constant ernission equal to 6, in all periods. 
Proof. The proof uses a standard dynamic programming argument. Let a = (a,). 
I t  is sufficient to show that the value function, V ,  given above satisfies the functional 
equation 
The first-order condition for a maximum is that,  for each i. 
But 0 = -w, so the optimal emission is independent of g, and is given by (7 ) The 
values of u and w are now determined by the equation 
which must be satisfied for all values of g. 
3.3.  A Markov-Nash Equilibrium. The next proposition describes a Markov 
Xash equilibrium. This MNE has the unusual feature that the equilibrium emission 
rate of each country is constant in time, and it is the unique MNE with t h s  property. 
There are, however, other MNEs; see (Dutta and Radner. 1998). 
Theorem 2. Let g be the initial stock of  GHG. For each country i, let a* * be deter- 
mined by 
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and let its strategy be to use a constmr emission equal to a,* in each period: then 
this strategy profile is a .MNE, and coul~try i s corresponding payoff is 
Note that 
urh ere w is defined in (6). 
Proof. The proof uses an argument similar to that of Theorem 1. If the emissions 
of all countries other than i are constant. say a, for country j. then country i faces 
a standard dynamic p rograming  problem. It is sufficient to show that the value 
function V,* satisfies the functional equation. 
The argument now proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Recall that both the globally optimal and MNE emission rates are constant in 
tsime. Let A be any constant global (total) emissions rate. The difference equation 
governing the evolution of the GHG stock is 
This can be solved t o  give 
g ( t )  = a" + ((1 - d)g, 
where 
The last quantity, 3; is of course the sieady-state GHG stock. 
If the cost of the stock of GHG were nonlinear, then one would expect the GPO 
and MNE emissions t o  vary with the stock, and in fact one would expect higher stocks 
to lead to lower emissions. 
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3.4. Compar i son  of t h e  GPO a n d  t h e  M N E .  The preceding results enable 
us to  compare the emissions in the GPO with those in the MNE: 
GPO : h : (Q  = 6 Cj XjC3 
xi (1 - So) ! 
From 
it follows that 
6 c, 
< 6 2, x,c, 1 - 60 x,(l  - So) 
Since hi is concave, it follows that 
Note that  this inequality holds for all vectors of strictly positive weights (x,). [I 
conjecture that  this inequality would hold in a variety of models. Indeed. one can show 
in a quite general model that a GPO cannot be a MNE, or even that,  starting from a 
GPO, each country will want to increase it emissions unilaterally by a small amount. 
However, to  get the inequality (15) one probably needs more specific assumptions.] 
It follows from these results that there is an open set of strictly positive weights 
(x,) such that  the corresponding GPO is strictly Pareto superior to  the MNE. We are 
therefore led to  search for (non-Markovian) Rash equilibria of the dynamic game that 
sustain a GPO. or at least are superior to  the MNE. Such a program is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but related research (e.g., Benhabib and Radner, 1992) suggests 
that such a search might succeed. 
3.5. Effects of Reduc ing  Emission Factors. I t  is generally agreed that it will 
not be possible to  achieve an acceptable level of global emissions of GHG without 
considerable research and development effort. If one expands the strategy spaces of 
the countries to  include research and development, and technology transfers among 
countries, it may be possible to improve the MNE itself. From the second line of 
(14) we see that MNE emissions of a country would be reduced if the slope of the 
function h, - call it the technology function - were reduced in the appropriate range. 
Recall that this function is maximized at  a "myopically optimal" level of emissions. 
The MNE level is smaller than this (since at  the MNE the slope of the technology 
function is strictly positive). The slope of the technology function to  the left of the 
myopic optimum reflects the cost of reducing emissions below the myopic optimum; 
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the greater the marginal cost of dolng this the steeper the slope. Technological 
~nnovatlorx rnay reduce this marglnal cost. If the costs to  advanced countries of 
develop~ng such innovations, and transferring them to other (presumably poorer). 
countries are not too high, it rnay be part of a MNE in such an "expanded" game 
for such activities to  take place. thus moving the global economy along a path of 
declining emissions. 
I shall illustrate this point In the context of a special c a e .  Suppose that  the ernis- 
s ~ o n  of GHG is entirely caused by the production and consumption of energy (which 
is. of course. an exaggeration). Imagine that energy is an input in the production 
function of each country, along with other inputs like capital. labor, etc. Assume that. 
as a function of the input of ene ra .  e,, in country i. it's net output in a given period 
is Y,(e , ) .  Assume further that the country's emission of GHG during the  period is 
proportional to  the input of energy. say 
I shall call the coefficient fi the emission factor of country i. Thus the  technology 
function is given by 
However, instead of directly applying Theorern 2 to  characterize the MNE, i t  is slightly 
more transparent t o  take the energy inputs as the control variables. In this case, the 
law of mot~ion (2) becomes: 
Note that  A(t)  is a linear function of the energy inputs of the several countries, with 
coefficients equal t o  their respective emission factors. The MNE energy inputs, el*, 
are the solutions of the equations: 
The value function for country i is: 
V,*(g) = ui - wig, 
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Research and development that "decarbonizes" energy inputs without increasing the 
price of energy would have the effect of decreasing the emission factors. Somewhat 
paradoxically. this need not  lead to a decrease in emzsszons for that country. From 
equation (17). 
Of course, if the energy input miere held constant, then a decrease in the emission 
factor would result in a decrease in the emissions. However, from equation (20) and 
the strict concavity of the function Y,, it is clear that 
Hence a decrease in the emission factor for a given country would result in an increase 
in its MNE energy input, t,hus having the effect of increasing its emissions. From (20): 
if and only if 
3 log ei* ( a  f ) = (Z) ($1 > -I.  
Note that the absolute value of the left-hand-side of (22) is what economists call the 
elasticity of el* with respect to f,. [See also (28)  below, and the discussion leading 
up to  it! for a special case.] 
On the other hand, that country's welfare in the MNE will nevertheless be in- 
creased. To see this, first note that the coefficient w ,  in the value function does not 
depend on the emission factor. Hence the value function is increasing in the emission 
factor if and only if the constant term, u,, is increasing. From (20), 
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(the last step following from the first-order condition (19). Hence I have proved: 
Theorem 3. For all g and i, 
V,  *(g ) is decreasing in the eniission factor fi  o f  country i . 
The effect on one country's MNE welfare of a change in anot,her country's emission 
factor is not so unambiguous. From (20); for j # i 
dui* aA* da, * (1 --a)= = 624- =r hwi --- 
a h  a f ,  ; 
and we saw in (23)-(24) that the sign of the last term depends on the elasticity of el* 
with respect to f,. I t  follows that,  if the cost of the R&D were sufficiently small: it 
might pay for a small group of advanced countries. or even a single advanced country, 
to  develop a technology for reducing emission factors and transfer that  technology to 
other countries, provided that (24) were satisfied for enough of the latter countries. 
A formal analysis of such situations is beyond the scope of this paper. 
I illustrate these results with a special case of the "production function" Y,  : 
where T, and 0, are positive parameters. with 8, < 1,and p, is the price of energy 
for country z. also a positive parameter. Such a formulation is consistent with a 
"Cobb-Douglas" production function in which labor is fixed exogenously, and the 
other inputs (e.g.. capital. but excluding energy) are optimized accordingly. (See 
below for a further discussion of this point.) 
In this special case. the MNE energy inputs are given by 
It turns out that the net effect on emissions depends on the size of the emission 
factor. I t  is straighforward to verify tha t  
Thus i f  the emission factor is  suficiently large, a decrease in it  will result in an 
increase in MNE emissions for that country. 
I now take a closer look at  the "production funct,ionJ' model in (26). Suppose that 
there are 3 factors of production, say capital, labor, and energy, and that  the (net) 
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output of a country in any period is determined by a "Cobb-Douglas" producton (to 
simplify the notat,ion. I temporarily suppress the country subscript): 
Y = 4 ~ ~ ~ ' e '  - r K  - pe, (29) 
where K, L. and e denote the inpits of capital, labor, and energy, respectively, and 
4, k, A, ~ , r ,  and p are positive parameters. Capital and energy are to be chosen 
optimally by the country (in the MNE), whereas labor is given exogenously, and is 
constant in time. I assume constant returns to scale: 
The amount of capital has no effect on emissions: so it will be chosen to  maximize 
Y. It is straightforward to  verify that, the optimal input of capital is: 
The corresponding output is: 
Of course, cP should have a country subscript i ,  as should all of the parameters and 
variables. From this last we see that the coefficient, xi , in (16) is given by: 
Since A, + 8, = 1, it follows from (21) that each country's MNE znput of energy is  
proportzonal t o  i t s  labor input ,  and hence so zs i t s  MNE level of emzsszons. 
One can also examine the effect on a Global Pareto Optimum of changing the 
emission factors of one or more countries. One obtains similar results, using argu- 
ments similar to  those leading up to Theorem 3 and equation (25), but I omit the 
details. 
4.  CONCLUDING REMKARKS 
I have argued that ,  for transnational problems like global warming, there is currently 
no effective world government to  enforce desirable changes in the "rules of the game." 
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Hence the standard paradigm of "mechanism design" needs to be replaced by a search 
for Nash equilibria of an appropriately modeled global dynamc game that are Pareto 
superior to  the current "business as usual" situation. I also suggested that is plausible 
that "business as usual" corresponds to a X/larkov-Nash equilibrium of the global 
dynamic game. This program poses a number of interesting challenges to the theorist. 
for a number of reasons: 
1. The relevant "game" is not simply repeated: there are significant state variables 
that  evolve through time. 
2. There are dramatic asymmetries among the players. 
3. Uncertainty is important. 
4. There are significant problem of representing intertemporal and distributional 
preferences. 
5. If one interprets a treaty as an articulation of a superior Wash equilibrium. 
then there is the question of how to move from the current equilibrium to  the one 
described by the treaty. 
I illustrated some of these ideas in the context of an oversimplified model of a 
"global ~varrning game." In this "toy" model, I characterized a particular Markov- 
Nash equilibrium (MNE), and compared it to  the set of global Pareto optimal out- 
comes (GPOs). In particular, the MNE emission level of greenhouse gases for each 
country turned out to  be higher than its emission level in any GPO. I also showed 
how the h4NE and GPOs would vary with changes in the technological coefficient 
('bemission factor") relating the level of a country's emissions to its use of energy. In 
particular, a decrease in one country's emission factor would increase its own MNE 
and GPO welfare. However, the effect on its emission rate cannot be determined with- 
out more information. In a special case derived from a "Cobb-Douglas'' production 
function. I showed that a decrease in one country's emission factor would decrease 
it's own MNE emission rate, and hence increase the welfare of all other countries. 
provided it's emission factor was not "too large." In this special case, each country's 
MNE emission level is also proportional to  the (exogenous) size of its labor input. 
after the levels of variable factors. such as capital, have been optimized. 
Several further comments on the model of Section 3 are called for: 
1. Attaining equilibria that are Pareto superior to  the MNE would probably be 
facilitated by observation of the actions (emissions) of the individual countries. It is 
not clear how accurately this can be done using current technology. Similarly, it has 
been implicitly assumed above that the stock of GHG at  any time can be measured 
without error. Measurement errors would make it more difficult t o  attain "trigger 
strategy equilibria" that sustain superior outcomes (moral hazard). 
2. The above model implicitly assumes constant populations, levels of economic 
development, and technology. Any model that is even semi-realistic would have to  
take account of changes in these factors. [For an analysis of a model with changing 
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population, see (Dutta and Radner. 1998). 
3. &/loving to Pareto superior equilibria would probably require "side payments" 
from some countries to  others. Because of moral hazard and related problems. it 
might be preferable to  make such side payments in the form of technology that can 
be used only for the purpose of reducing emissions.(See Section 3.5 for a discussion 
of the effects on the MNE of reducing emission factors.) 
4. More generally, ~noving to a superior equilibrium would be a process that 
takes time. Whether and how such a process could take place in a "self-enforcing'' or 
"self-confirming' manner is a challenge for analysis. 
5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
These notes were prepared for the Woytinsky Lecture. University of Michigan. March 
11, 1998. Previous versions were presented at  a meeting of the Association of Southern 
European Economic Theorists. Marseille: Nov. 1, 1997, and the Bosphorus Workshop 
on Economic Design, XX, August. 1997. I would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky. 
Prajit K. Dutta, Arnulf Grubler. Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter 
de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer. Giuseppe Lopomo. Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra. 
Michael Tornan for helpful discussions and references. and Andrew King, Charlotte 
V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present 
enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of my previous expertise, it is even more 
important than usual to  emphasize that I am responsible for all errors. 
6 .  SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY O N  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
[Note: There is by now an enormous literature on the subject of sustainable develop- 
ment. and I have made no attempt to  make this bibliography comprehensive.] 
Ahmad, Y. J., Salah El Serafy, and E. Lutz (eds.), Environmental Accounting for 
Sustainable Development, Washington, DC: World Bank. 1989. 
Ausubel, Jesse H., et  al, "The Liberation of the Environment ," Daedalus, Summer, 
1996. 1-253. 
Benhabib, Jess, and Roy Radner, "Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset." 
Economic Theory, 2 (1992). 155-190. 
Bradford, David F., "On the Uses of Benefit-Cost Reasoning in Choosing Policy 
toward Global Climate Change," Working Paper 127. Center of Economic Studies. 
Univ. of Munich, 1997 (unpublished). 
Bruce, James P., Hoesung Lee. and Erik F. Haites. eds., Climate Change 1995: 
Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
Bruntland, Gro Harlem, et al, Our Common Future. World Commission on En- 
vironment and Development (WCED), Oxford University Press, Oxford, England. 
1987. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-2 
Chichilnisky, Graciela. "An *L~iomatic Approach to  Sustainable Developn~ent." 
Social Choice and Welfare, 13 (1996), 231-2517. 
Chichilnisky, Graciela. "What is Sustainable Development?," Columbia Univ.. 
No?.. 1996 (to appear in Land Economics). 
Cline, William R.. The Economics of Global MArming. Institute for International 
Economics. Washington. DC. 1992. 
Dasgupta, Partha. "The Population Problem: Theory and Evidence." J .  Econ. 
Lit.. 33 (Dec. 1995). 1879-102. 
Dasgupta, Swapan. and Tapan Mitra. "On the IVelfare Significance of National 
Product for Economic Growth and Sustainable Development.'' Department of Eco- 
nomics. Cornell University. March 1997 (unpublished) 
Deevey, Edward. "The Human Population." Scientific American, 203 (1960). 194- 
204. 
Dutta, Prajit K.. and Roy Radner, "A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming." 
1998 (in preparation). 
Dutta, Prajit K., and Rangarajan IS. Sundaram. "The Equilibrium Existence 
Problem in General Markovian Games." Dept. of Economics, Columbia U.. Jan- 
uary 1996 (to appear in Mukul K. Majumdar. ed.. Organizations with Incomplete 
Information, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge. 1998). 
Gladwin, Thomas N.. et al, "Why is the Northern Elite Mind Biased against 
Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future?," in Max H. Bazerman. 
et al, eds., Environment. Ethics, and Behavior: The Psychology of Environmental 
Valuation and Degradation, The New Lexington Press, San Francisco, 1997, pp. 234- 
274. 
Grubler, Arnulf. and Yasumasa Fujii, "Intergenerational and Spatial Equity Issues 
of Carbon Accounts." Energy, 16 (1991), 1397-1416. 
Heal, Geoffrey M., Ynterpreting Sustainability." Columbia Univ. Business School. 
May 1997 (unpublished). 
Heal, Geoffrey, M.. Valuing the Future: Economic Theory and Sustainability, 1996 
(unpublished). 
Hurwicz, Leonid. "Implementation and Enforcement in Institutional Modeling," 
in V \ T .  A. Barnett. et al. eds., Political Economy: Institutions, Competition. and 
Representation, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
Hururicz, Leonid. "Institutions as Families of Game Forms," Japanese Economic 
Review, 47 (June 1996), 113-132. 
Lee, Ronald, "Long-Run Global Population Forecasts: A Critical Appraisal," in 
Iiingsley Davis and htfikhail S. Bernstam. eds., Resources, Environment, and Popu- 
lation: Present Knowledge, Future Options. Oxford U. Press, New York, 1991. 
Kates, Robert UT.. "Population, Technology. and the Human Environment: A 
Thread Through Time," in (Ausubel et all 1996, pp. 43-71). 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-2 
Nakicenovic, Nebojsa, "Freeing Energy from Carbon," in (Ausubel, et al, 1996, 
pp. 95-112). 
Nordhaus, William D., and Zili Yang, "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium 
Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, 86 
(1996), 741-765. 
Pearce, D. W., -4. hilarkandaya and E. B. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy, 
Earthscan, London, 1989. 
Radner, Roy, "Dynamic Games in Organizat,ion Theory," J. of Econo~nic Behavior 
and Organization, 16 (1991), 217-260. 
Radner, Roy, "Bounded Rationality, Indet,errninacy, and the Theory of t,he Firm," 
Economic Journal, 106, no. 438 (Sept. 1996): 1360-1373. 
Schelling, Thomas C., "Intergenerational Discounting," Energy Policy, 23 (Apr.- 
May, 1995), 395-402. 
Schotter, Andrew R., The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge U. 
Press, Cambridge, 1981. 
Sobel, Matthew J., "Myopic Solutions of Affine Dynamic Models:" Operations 
Research, 38 (1990), 847-53. 
Thomson, David J., "Dependence of Global Temperatures on Atmospheric C 0 2  
and Solar Irradiance," Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 94 (1997), 8370-7'7. 
Toman, Michael A., John Pezzey, and Jeffrey Krautkraerner, "Neoclassical Eco- 
nomic Gr0wt.h Theory and 'Sustainabillity'," in Daniel W, Broniley, ed., Handbook 
of En~ironment~al Economics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995, pp. 139-165 
Victor, David G., and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Implementing Environmental Corn- 
mitments," Options, IIASA, Spring 1997, 7-11. 
Weitzman, Martin L., "Sustainability and the Welfare Significance of National 
Product Revisited," Discussion Paper 1737, Harvard Ins. of Econ. Res., Harvard 
Univ., Sept. 1995 (unpublished). 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-2 
Fig. 1. Reproduced from (Kales, 1996), updated and redrawn 
from (Deevey, 1960). 
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Fig. 2. Reproduced from (Kates, 19961, after (Lee, 1991, p. 59). 
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Fig. 3. Reproduced from (Grubler and  Fujii, 1991). 
g i g a t o n s  
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-99-2 
-ii 
& 
Fig. 4. Reproduced from (Grub le r  a n d  Fujii,  1991). 
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Fig. 5. Reproduced  from (Grub le r  and  Fujii, 1991). 
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Fig. 1. Energy carbon intensity per constant G D P ,  in kg carbon per U.S.$ 1985 vs per capita GRP.  
Energy data include also non-commercial sources such ni luelwood. Note the improving carbon 
intensity of econornic activities ns a function of the degree of' economic development and remaining 
decisive differences between countries for similar per capita G D p  levels. 
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